CWE-787 跨界内存写

Out-of-bounds Write

结构: Simple

Abstraction: Base

状态: Draft

被利用可能性: High


The software writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.


Typically, this can result in corruption of data, a crash, or code execution. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent write operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.


  • cwe_Nature: ChildOf cwe_CWE_ID: 119 cwe_View_ID: 1000 cwe_Ordinal: Primary

  • cwe_Nature: ChildOf cwe_CWE_ID: 119 cwe_View_ID: 1003 cwe_Ordinal: Primary

  • cwe_Nature: ChildOf cwe_CWE_ID: 119 cwe_View_ID: 699 cwe_Ordinal: Primary


Language: [{'cwe_Name': 'C', 'cwe_Prevalence': 'Often'}, {'cwe_Name': 'C++', 'cwe_Prevalence': 'Often'}, {'cwe_Class': 'Assembly', 'cwe_Prevalence': 'Undetermined'}]


范围 影响 注释
['Integrity', 'Availability'] ['Modify Memory', 'DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart', 'Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands']


DM-1 Automated Static Analysis

This weakness can often be detected using automated static analysis tools. Many modern tools use data flow analysis or constraint-based techniques to minimize the number of false positives.

Automated static analysis generally does not account for environmental considerations when reporting out-of-bounds memory operations. This can make it difficult for users to determine which warnings should be investigated first. For example, an analysis tool might report buffer overflows that originate from command line arguments in a program that is not expected to run with setuid or other special privileges.

Detection techniques for buffer-related errors are more mature than for most other weakness types.

DM-2 Automated Dynamic Analysis

This weakness can be detected using dynamic tools and techniques that interact with the software using large test suites with many diverse inputs, such as fuzz testing (fuzzing), robustness testing, and fault injection. The software's operation may slow down, but it should not become unstable, crash, or generate incorrect results.


MIT-3 Requirements

策略: Language Selection

Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer. Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.

MIT-4.1 Architecture and Design

策略: Libraries or Frameworks

Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.

MIT-10 Build and Compilation

策略: Compilation or Build Hardening

Run or compile the software using features or extensions that automatically provide a protection mechanism that mitigates or eliminates buffer overflows. For example, certain compilers and extensions provide automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are built into the compiled code. Examples include the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice.

MIT-9 Implementation

策略: Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application's memory:

MIT-11 Operation

策略: Environment Hardening

Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code. Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64].

MIT-12 Operation

策略: Environment Hardening

Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (NX) or its equivalent [REF-60] [REF-61].

MIT-13 Implementation


Replace unbounded copy functions with analogous functions that support length arguments, such as strcpy with strncpy. Create these if they are not available.


The following code attempts to save four different identification numbers into an array.

bad C

int id_sequence[3];

/ Populate the id array. /

id_sequence[0] = 123;
id_sequence[1] = 234;
id_sequence[2] = 345;
id_sequence[3] = 456;

In the following example, it is possible to request that memcpy move a much larger segment of memory than assumed:

bad C

int returnChunkSize(void ) {

if chunk info is valid, return the size of usable memory,

else, return -1 to indicate an error

int main() {
memcpy(destBuf, srcBuf, (returnChunkSize(destBuf)-1));

If returnChunkSize() happens to encounter an error it will return -1. Notice that the return value is not checked before the memcpy operation (CWE-252), so -1 can be passed as the size argument to memcpy() (CWE-805). Because memcpy() assumes that the value is unsigned, it will be interpreted as MAXINT-1 (CWE-195), and therefore will copy far more memory than is likely available to the destination buffer (CWE-787, CWE-788).

This example takes an IP address from a user, verifies that it is well formed and then looks up the hostname and copies it into a buffer.

bad C

void host_lookup(char user_supplied_addr){
struct hostent hp;
in_addr_t addr;
char hostname[64];
in_addr_t inet_addr(const char

/routine that ensures user_supplied_addr is in the right format for conversion /

addr = inet_addr(user_supplied_addr);
hp = gethostbyaddr( addr, sizeof(struct in_addr), AF_INET);
strcpy(hostname, hp->h_name);

This function allocates a buffer of 64 bytes to store the hostname, however there is no guarantee that the hostname will not be larger than 64 bytes. If an attacker specifies an address which resolves to a very large hostname, then we may overwrite sensitive data or even relinquish control flow to the attacker.

Note that this example also contains an unchecked return value (CWE-252) that can lead to a NULL pointer dereference (CWE-476).

This example applies an encoding procedure to an input string and stores it into a buffer.

bad C

char * copy_input(char user_supplied_string){
int i, dst_index;
dst_buf = (char)malloc(4sizeof(char) * MAX_SIZE);
if ( MAX_SIZE <= strlen(user_supplied_string) ){
die("user string too long, die evil hacker!");
dst_index = 0;
for ( i = 0; i < strlen(user_supplied_string); i++ ){
if( '&' == user_supplied_string[i] ){
dst_buf[dst_index++] = '&';
dst_buf[dst_index++] = 'a';
dst_buf[dst_index++] = 'm';
dst_buf[dst_index++] = 'p';
dst_buf[dst_index++] = ';';
else if ('<' == user_supplied_string[i] ){

/ encode to &lt; /
else dst_buf[dst_index++] = user_supplied_string[i];
return dst_buf;

The programmer attempts to encode the ampersand character in the user-controlled string, however the length of the string is validated before the encoding procedure is applied. Furthermore, the programmer assumes encoding expansion will only expand a given character by a factor of 4, while the encoding of the ampersand expands by 5. As a result, when the encoding procedure expands the string it is possible to overflow the destination buffer if the attacker provides a string of many ampersands.

In the following C/C++ example, a utility function is used to trim trailing whitespace from a character string. The function copies the input string to a local character string and uses a while statement to remove the trailing whitespace by moving backward through the string and overwriting whitespace with a NUL character.

bad C

char trimTrailingWhitespace(char strMessage, int length) {
char retMessage;
message = malloc(sizeof(char)*(length+1));

// copy input string to a temporary string
char message[length+1];
int index;
for (index = 0; index < length; index++) {
message[index] = strMessage[index];
message[index] = '\0';

// trim trailing whitespace
int len = index-1;
while (isspace(message[len])) {
message[len] = '\0';

// return string without trailing whitespace
retMessage = message;
return retMessage;

However, this function can cause a buffer underwrite if the input character string contains all whitespace. On some systems the while statement will move backwards past the beginning of a character string and will call the isspace() function on an address outside of the bounds of the local buffer.

The following is an example of code that may result in a buffer underwrite, if find() returns a negative value to indicate that ch is not found in srcBuf:

bad C

int main() {
strncpy(destBuf, &srcBuf[find(srcBuf, ch)], 1024);

If the index to srcBuf is somehow under user control, this is an arbitrary write-what-where condition.


标识 说明 链接
CVE-2002-2227 Unchecked length of SSLv2 challenge value leads to buffer underflow.
CVE-2007-4580 Buffer underflow from a small size value with a large buffer (length parameter inconsistency, CWE-130)
CVE-2007-4268 Chain: integer signedness error (CWE-195) passes signed comparison, leading to heap overflow (CWE-122)
CVE-2009-2550 Classic stack-based buffer overflow in media player using a long entry in a playlist
CVE-2009-2403 Heap-based buffer overflow in media player using a long entry in a playlist